Theistic Ethics: Toward a Christian Solution by Baggett, David J.
 5 
! !
THEISTIC ETHICS: TOWARD A 
CHRISTIAN SOLUTION 
DAVID J. BAGGETT 
Despite the theological and popularly conceived connections between religious 
devotion and moral living, the difficulties attending theological or religious ethics-
the attempt to tie ethics to theology or religion in some impottant sense-are myri· 
ad. Thanks largely to Enlightenment thought, morality has come to be construed as 
independent of God, so much so that the majority of moral philosophers today 
would without hesitation affirm that even if God exists, morality can exist apart 
from God-an ontological critique-and, if the precepts or dictates of morality can be 
known at all, they can be known apart from religious orthodoxy or theological 
reflection-an epistemological critique. 
Since the Enlightenment, at least, and in particular since Kan(s epistemological 
dualism, questions of religion and "speculative metaphysics" have often been consid· 
ered beyond the ken of rationality.' Kant's motivation, it has been suggested, was to 
spare religion from the rigorous scrutiny of the emerging science of his day; but the 
actual result proved to be detrimental to religious conviction, for it began to be por· 
!rayed as an inescapably subjective affair. Universal truth claims became harder to 
reconcile with this kind of epistemology, which is likely the inevitable while para· 
doxical effect of implicitly putting religion and science at odds. Religious truth claims 
tend to be increasingly construed as devoid of propositional content and rational 
evidence and are instead seen as empty faith claims rooted in a person's imagination 
or a group's collective psyche. 
The understanding of science and religion as essentially and historically opposed, 
incidentally, is largely mistaken. Although it is true that certain theologians and 
churchmen have historically stood in the way of scientific progress, it is far from true 
that all of them have, even a majority; and in fact, as Alfred North Whitehead has 
persuasively argued, the origins of modem science, such as faith in the orderliness of 
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nature and its ability to be apprehended and described rationally, are largely attributable 
to the Medieval and Scholastic effort to rationalize the divinely ordered creation.' Stanley 
Jaki goes further in characterizing such foundations of science as the consequence of 
orthodox Christology. "A truly divine Logos, in Whom the Father created all, so 
Athanasius insisted time and again, could not produce a partially disordered universe."' 
Nonetheless the mistakenly perceived tension between science and religion con-
tributed to their artificial separation. It was long thought that morality could be salvaged 
from such a fate by being rooted in reason rather than revelation. Indeed, this effort 
serves as one effective summary of the Enlightenment: to ground ethics in reason rather 
than religion and thereby retain its authoritative force. However, severed from its ontolog-
ical foundations, morality has proved notoriously difficult to undergird by reason alone, so 
much so that the Enlightenment project has recently often been characterized as a failure. 
One result is that morality, still often perceived to be in religion's vicinity, is increasingly 
absorbed into Kant s noumena\ realm of the unknowable, inscrutable and, for practical 
purposes, thereby construed as a purely individual affair. This despite the obvious fact that 
Kant himself was no subjectivist in ethics. 
Pre-modern and what is often called post-modern thought have in common their 
grounding of morality in God, the salient difference being that pre-modems, generally, 
believed in God, whereas post-modems, generally, do not. If morality is rooted in a God 
who doesn't exist, of course, then morality is largely illusory; and this seems to be an 
increasingly common view: that morality is either purely conventional, or a way to keep 
the proletariat in line, or a repression of our best instincts, and the list goes on. No won-
der that some have tried to show that traditional conceptions of morality can exist inde-
pendently of any appeal to theology, and I have a certain sympathy for such efforts. 
Nonetheless, like many theists, I also have a nagging sense that morality, ultimately, has to 
be grounded in God. So, in this paper, what I intend to do is, first, identify some of the 
philosophical problems for religious ethics in general and Christian ethics in particular. 
Then I will attempt a short defense of a Christian theistic ethic. 
REUGIOUS ETHICS CRmQUED 
To begin with, morality, as religiously construed, is often thought of as either a require-
ment or result of salvation. As such it is depicted as necessary for, in one sense or another, 
a relationship with God and entrance into heaven. Conversely, an immoral life is charac-
terized in terms of an absence of a relationship with God and punishable by consignment 
to hell. As such, a moral life is enjoined by religion, it is suggested, merely, in J. P. 
Moreland's words, to "cover one's cosmic rear end to avoid getting flames on it."4 
One criticism of such ethical views is that morality entails a quality of life that ought to 
be conducted primarily, if not exclusively, out of a desire to do it and not mainly, if at a\\, 
out of a motivation to avoid punishment or earn a reward. The latter, which is argued to 
be the thrust behind religious ethics, would constitute an egoistic approach to ethics, 
according to which, as seen, moral decisions are made with respect to "what's in it for me." 
Moral philosophers, often influenced by Kant, typically bristle, and rightly so, at the sug-
gestion that morality's motivation is one of earning a reward or avoiding a punishment. 
Divine retribution or reward seems unable to be a legitimate form of moral motivation, yet 
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this condition often seems at the heart of basing ethics on theology. Seemingly altruistic 
behaviors, thus motivated, at their root would then reveal self-interested motivations; rather 
than feeding the poor, clothing the naked, and housing the homeless out of genuine con-
cern for them and their welfare, the ultimate motivation would instead be sheer self-interest 
The power of God to effect his purposes might certainly constitute a motive to live 
morally in such a scenario, albeit an ethically dangerous one, but not a rational reason. 
Any such purely self-interested moral motivations are necessarily infantile, some have 
argued. For they are roughly akin to the truncated ethical perspective of children, who 
also, in the earliest stages of moral development, understand morality in terms of avoiding 
punishments and earning rewards. Drawing on Piaget's research of young children, P. H. 
Nowell-Smith argues for such a parallel between religious moralists and children in the 
heteronomous stage of development, since both groups, while lacking in those marks of 
moral maturity and adulthood such as autonomy and personal responsibility, view moral 
rules as sacred and authoritatively imposed from the outside.' 
At the heart of Nowell-Smith's critique of religious ethics is his concern that it tends to be 
more concerned with adherence to rules rather than the quality of people's lives and a con-
cern for people's welfare for their own sake. Rules, as seen by the morally mature, exist for a 
purpose and fulfill distinct functions. But the heteronomous child and religious moralist both 
regard rules as, in essence, ends in themselves, never to be questioned. Even Abraham, the 
Old Testament patriarch, is shown laudably willing to sacrifice his own son on the altar at 
the whim of the divine. By thus relinquishing one's moral autonomy to divine control; being 
excessively concerned, even pathologically preoccupied, about the welfare of one's soul; and 
making moral determinations based on God's commands, potentially even capricious ones, 
religious moralists betray childish elements in their ethical philosophy. 
Even supposing that God does issue a command to human beings, such as the "most 
important" command to love God with all of your heart, soul, mind, and strength, and 
your neighbor as yourself, another problem immediately arises, one which Kant noticed 
and contemporary philosopher Richard Taylor elaborates on.6 Such an edict can't be 
issued, for love, as an emotion, can't be commanded. An ought requires a can; no sensible 
command requires of us to do that which we are incapable of doing. The command to 
love, as a command to assume an emotional disposition toward God or another, treats 
human emotion as something under direct volitional control. Since it is not-we can't 
directly generate emotions at will-the command is nonsensical. Duty and love seem 
incompatible in an ethical system; yet religious ethics conjoin them, another problem with 
rooting morality in theology. In this connection, Taylor writes the following: 
The insight that love, as a feeling, is incompatible with the incentive of duty, is 
plainly correct. In the light of it one can expunge feelings of love from theoretical 
ethics, or one can expunge the incentive of duty. Kant took the former course, 
and I take the latter.' 
Besides those problems associated with religious ethics, one philosophical problem, 
more than any other, has been a thorn in the flesh of theologians and religious moral 
philosophers since the time of Plato, and has been dubbed the Euthyphro Dilemma, aris-
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ing as it does in the Socratic dialogue Euthyphro. Socrates, Plato's teacher, meets a young 
man, Euthyphro, going to the courthouse to sue his father. In ancient Greece, the setting 
for this story, loyalty to family was a highly exalted virtue, so Socrates is naturally shocked 
at Euthyphro's intention to do this, and remarks that Euthyphro must have a clearly 
defined sense of justice to undertake such an ambitious course of action. Euthyphro confi-
dently assures Socrates that in fact he does, and proceeds to define justice, or what we 
might call morality today, in terms of the commands of the gods, according to the Creek 
conception of a pantheon of gods. When Socrates begins to point out that, according to 
the mythical accounts of the gods, their commands sometimes conflicted, problems with 
Euthyphro's account begin to manifest themselves. 
The problems attending the attempt to define morality in supematuralistic terms soon 
become applicable to monotheism as well, as the famous Dilemma arises a little further 
along in the dialogue. Socrates asks Euthyphro a pointed question, and one that has 
plagued moral philosophy ever since. Does, to put this in monotheistic terms, Cod define 
the good, or merely report the good? There is a difference. When you tell another that the 
sum of two and two is four, you are merely reporting this to be the case, not somehow 
making or defining it that way of your own volition. The question is whether Cod reveals 
to us the contents of morality irrespective of his own commands or nature, in which case 
he would be merely reporting on morality and not ultimately responsible for its contents 
after all, or does He actually define morality, conforming its contents to his own wilP If 
we affirm the former option-that Cod only reports the good-then we have to agree 
with the thrust of contemporary moral philosophy that has divorced Cod from morality's 
ultimate origins. Cod would be commanding something because it is already good prior 
to and independent of his command. If we wish to affirm the latter option-that Cod 
defines morality (then and only then perhaps reports itl-then we're confronted with a 
potential problem. For then something is good because Cod commands it, but suppose 
that Cod, tomorrow, were to decree that torturing innocent children for the fun of it is 
the moral thing to do. If Cod is the one exclusively responsible for dictating the contents 
of morality, there is no recourse for anyone else to claim that such a command is morally 
perverse. By issuing the decree, Cod has thereby redefined morality. Morality is thus arbi-
trary, entirely contingent on the capricious will of heaven. 
Of course, the history of religious conquest, holy wars, and inquisitions reminds us that 
cruelty in the name of God, ostensibly in accord with his purposes, is no academic discus-
sion. Measured by its own standards, Christianity has fallen woefully short of ethical great-
ness, reminding us that belief in God is by no means sufficient for ensuring a mature ethi-
cal way of life, as the number of religious adherents who have perpetrated evils in the 
name of God so clearly attests. Nor is religious adherence even a needed precondition for 
moral living, it would seem, for many atheists indeed live exemplary lives of moral excel-
lence. Kai Nielsen thus argues that, even if "Cod is dead," it doesn't matter for ethics. 
Arguing from features he finds in this world, Nielsen points out that atheists often live 
altruistically, find meaning in life, express compassion, thereby going to show that Cod 
seems unnecessary for ethics.8 Ethics can get by just fine without him. 
Given such glaring weaknesses and strong critiques of religious ethics, it is not surpris-
ing that Derek Parfit is one among others who claims that holding on to outmoded reli-
. _ _.......,._.,.. ,,, ,.,,,,' ................ .............. , 
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gious views is an impediment to moral philosophy that had better be jettisoned as soon as 
possible. Indeed, some have essentially asserted that theistic beliefs, rather than grounding 
our morality and enabling us to determine the normative contents and metaethical justifi-
cation for our moral convictions, can actually perform the opposite function of blinding us 
to morality as rooted in reason or human flourishing or whatever precisely it is that serves 
as the true foundation for morality. "Belief in God, or in many gods," Parfit writes, "[has! 
prevented free development of moral reasoning." Parfit is optimistic about the possibility 
of progress in ethics precisely to the extent we extricate ourselves from superstitious reli-
gious beliefs and begin to reason autonomously." 
THEISTIC ETHICS DEFENDED 
Against such arguments, and contrary to the trend in modem moral philosophy, theistic 
ethics will nevertheless now be defended, with the aim to show that the case against it has 
yet to be made. What will be provided here, with no pretense that every relevant question is 
answered or problem solved, are a few suggestive lines of arguments that show promise in 
salvaging a meaningful connection between God and morality in the face of such challenges. 
This section will make reference to theistic, rather than religious or theological, ethics to 
denote the fact that the type of connection between God and morality that will be 
defended, though it will possess numerous practical implications, will generally be at a 
higher level of abstraction than the plane on which this topic is usually discussed. It will be 
more ontological than epistemological and more metaethical than normative. Too often, 
it seems, theistic ethics have to account for the failings of religionists to live morally, or the 
successes of atheists in attaining moral excellence, while such phenomena, reflection 
shows, do little to discount the possibility that God himself is the Author of morality irre-
spective of what is done by some of his alleged followers or detractors. 
No doubt it is particularly a concern the way religious adherents have too often failed 
to live up to even minimal moral standards, but the attempted defense of theistic ethics 
provided here will have little difficulty accommodating such empirical sociological realities. 
Religious affiliation or mere propositional assent is often a poor indicator of genuine reli-
gious life and spiritual devotion anyway, it is to be remembered. "The Old Testament 
prophets bear eloquent witness to this, reserving some of their fiercest denunciation for 
those who delight in solemn assemblies and external ritual," William Abraham reminds 
us. 10 Jesus himself issued his most damning indictments to the religious leaders of his day." 
MORAL FACTS 
So to begin this defense, it is observed that typically socialized human beings have 
rather clear moral intuitions about what is right and wrong, or morally exemplary or 
hideous, which are more than just hunches or prereflective expressions of moral attitudes. 
As Geisler and Moreland write, 
While philosophers differ over a precise definition of intuitions, a common usage 
defines an intuition as an immediate, direct awareness or acquaintance with some-
thing. An intuition is a mode of awareness-sensory, intellectual, or otherwise-in 
which something seems or appears to be directly present to one's consciousness." 
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Ethicists like Alasdair Macintyre and R. M. Hare think ethicists have gone wrong when-
ever an appeal to intuitions is necessary; but I rather agree with Saul Kripke's view: that it 
is difficult to see what could be said more strongly for a view than that it squares with 
one's basic, reflective intuitions. Philosophy ought to be largely in the business of spelling 
out in more rigorous ways what can be intuitively grasped by nearly anyone. Such intu-
itive appeals seem both unavoidable and epistemologically significant. Though not infalli-
ble, they are at least prima facie justified. 
The French philosopher jean-Paul Sartre, in an effort to argue for his existentialist 
ethics, uses examples like a young soldier deciding whether to go to war or to stay home 
and be his mother's consolation." Sartre employs such examples to show the difficulty of 
making certain ethical determinations, and writings like his in conjunction with the wide-
spread use of what Christina Hoff-Sommers has called "dilemma ethics"-moral dialogue 
focused on trying to decide the "hard cases"-have contributed to the notion that the 
whole field of ethics is colored grey. The old certainties are gone; ambiguity wins the day. 
Everything is up for grabs when it comes to questions of morality. 
Despite the common nature of such views, most decisions in ethics are not fraught 
with ambiguity and tensions between commensurate competing commitments. As is 
obvious from clear examples of moral behavior, the vast majority of people's moral intu-
itions remain intact and quite strong. Perhaps ethics are too often thought about in tenns 
of the peripheral dilemmas and occasional ambiguities, overlooking and thereby skewing 
our perception of the vast intuitive area of agreement that actually obtains both across 
diverse cultures and throughout the centuries of human history. Perhaps morality has to 
be seen at its best, or at its worst, for it is then our intuitions are felt the strongest and the 
distinctive features of moral facts most clearly apprehended, with no ambiguities or heart-
wrenching dilemmas to cloud our vision. Eventually those dilemmas have to be account-
ed for as well, but the suggestion here is that they are not the proper place to begin. One 
doesn't learn subtle tennis strategy when he first must learn how to hit a groundstroke. 
To elicit such commonsensical moral intuitions, consider the following scenario, asking 
yourself whether you can affirm the moral propriety of such an action: 
They brought the boy out of the guardroom. It was a bleak, foggy, raw day-an 
ideal day for hunting. The General ordered the boy stripped naked. The boy [who 
while playing had inadvertently injured the General's dog] was shivering. He 
seemed paralyzed with fear. He didn't dare utter a sound. 'Off with him now, chase 
him'' 'Hey, you, run, run 1' a flunkey yelled, and the boy started to run. 'Sic 'im 1' the 
General roared. The whole pack was set on the boy and the hounds tore him to 
pieces before his mother's eyes. 14 
Those chilling lines from Fyodor Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov sicken readers, 
filling them with moral indignation. Common sense moral intuitions declare sue h an act 
to be heinous and barbaric. Sartre's point would have been lost had he begun not with a 
genuine moral dilemma, but with an appeal to people's moral intuitions, such as by asking 
whether the General should have acted in this way. The answer is clear. Something 
incongruous is readily discernible about the General's actions, quite irrespective of 
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whether the General derived pleasure from the act, perhaps accounting for the characteri-
zation of such behavior as inhuman. 
Just as there is an unfittingness about the General's action, there is an obvious fitting-
ness and congruity about morally good behavior generally and morally excellent behavior 
particularly, resulting in what has been called the "satisfactions of morality." "Moral people 
have long testified as to the strength and value of such satisfactions, often claiming that 
they are the most agreeable satisfactions we can attain."15 
Behaviors characterized as morally exemplary are typically those which, if an agent 
performs them, she is said to be morally praiseworthy, whereas, if the agent fails to per-
form them, she isn't blameworthy. Such behaviors are thought of as going beyond what is 
expected of the moral agent, such as a selfless life of service to the sick, or a sacrifice of a 
lucrative medical career to serve the needs of a destitute village. Philosophers call such 
actions supererogatory, and sometimes debate whether such behaviors can even be 
accommodated according to normative ethical theory. Utilitarianism, for instance, doesn't 
merely suggest maximizing utility, but renders the maximization of utility one's moral oblig-
ation, thus raising the question of whether there ever really is anything like optional praise-
worthy moral action. 16 
The aspect of supererogatory actions that will be stressed for this discussion, though, is 
different. Irrespective of the relative obligation one thinks attaches to such actions, the less 
arguable and most obvious element of supererogatory actions is their laudable selfless 
nature that resonates with our, in James Q. Wilson's phrase, "moral sense." Witnessing 
such behavior gives us, we suspect, a portrait of humanity at its best, a glimpse into life as 
it was meant to be lived, and perhaps one day will be. 
Consulting our intuitions, what can we say about the nature of morality and of moral 
facts7 If moral facts exist, they would seem to be, prima facie, ontologically rather odd enti-
ties as far as most facts go. Moral facts, in addition to conveying a description of nature, 
are also ineliminably prescriptive, normatively involving an appeal to what ought or ought 
not to be done. Moral facts thereby direct us to action, confer obligation, in a way that no 
merely descriptive fact characterizing some state of affairs can do without being conjoined 
with at least implicitly prescriptive ones. 
Morality is thought to confer obligations and provide evaluative constraints not just on 
particular acts or ways of life, but even on our motivations. Saving a drowning child in the 
hope of earning a reward, though resulting in a good consequence, is still generally thought 
of as less than morally exemplary behavior. Moral motivations, as earlier discussed, need to 
largely transcend the hope of a reward or the effort to avoid a punishment to include gen-
uine concern for the welfare of others, sincere desire to alleviate suffering, etc. 
Morality, in its dominant tradition in western culture, involves rights and duties, rights 
to which people are entitled and obligations conferred upon people, sometimes at great 
personal sacrifice. Morality involves the ascription of moral praise and blame, either for 
actions performed or actions failed to be performed. The moral conferring of obligation 
and the assigning of blame, it is thought, are not contingent on the satisfaction of the 
moral agent's personal interest or advantage, but seem to possess a kind of authority irre-
spective of such considerations. That morality seems to provide intrinsic motives to virtue 
without at the same time always providing instrumental advantages based on prudence 
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has been long thought to be one of the great ethical difficulties left unsolved." 
The oddness of moral facts is obviously in part attributable to this prescriptive feature 
of theirs which, perhaps, is what motivated G. E. Moore to conclude that no naturalistic 
proposal for constructing a definition of "good" could suffice.'" Moore characterized the 
misguided attempt to define "good" by reducing it to any natural property-such as the 
maximization of pleasure or the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people-by 
the term "naturalistic fallacy." No merely naturalistic property seems able to accommodate 
this prescriptively binding force characterizing morality traditionally understood. 
Thought of in terms of this tricky prescriptive element that enjoins a certain kind of 
behavior, Moore's point can be construed along the lines of David Hume's writing from 
two centuries before, in which he criticized the attempt to derive an ought from an is. Such 
a derivation has been described in various ways, such as going from a description to a pre-
saiption, from a faa to a norm or value, or from an indimtive to an imperative. The same idea 
would appear later in Kant's insistence that the dictates and imperatives of the moral law 
can't be derived from any set of propositions about human happiness or the will of God." 
Rather than discussing Moore's or Hume's point at great length, which has been done 
elsewhere by numerous writers, here the discussion will instead focus on what constitutes 
the best explanation of such ontologically odd entities as moral facts, if indeed they exist at 
all. Rather than morality, given its distinct features, needing to be divorced from God's 
nature or will, the opposite conclusion has often been drawn, even by no less a thinker than 
the influential twentieth-century atheist J. L. Mackie. "Moral properties," the late philosopher 
wrote, "constitute so odd a cluster of properties and relations that they are most unlikely to 
have arisen in the ordinal)' course of events \vithout an all-powerful god to create them."20 
That is, according to Mackie, moral facts-entities ascribing praise and blame for actions 
committed or omitted; conferring duties irrespective of the moral agent's cares and inter-
ests; calling for sacrifice of self-interest and, quite independent of outcomes, a purity of 
moral motivation-have for their best explanation, assuming they exist, a theistic premise. 
Unless God somehow caused such strange facts to come into existence, they are other-
wise most unlikely to have developed naturalistically. 
As an atheist, Mackie was dubious about the existence of such moral facts; but his sen-
timent-expressible in terms of the counterfactual conditional "If moral facts exist, then 
God probably created them" -could not be more eloquently echoed by any theist. Since 
God's nonexistence or irrelevance would negate the consequent of Mackie's conditional, 
it is not surprising that he and numerous other atheists before and after him have con-
cluded that their worldview entails a rejection or loss of morality as traditionally under-
stood. Sartre, for instance, expressed such a sentiment: 
Towards 1880, when the French professors endeavored to formulate a secular 
morality, they said something like this: God is a useless hypothesis, so we will do 
without it. However, if we are to have morality, a society and a law-abiding world, it 
is essential that certain values should be taken seriously; they must have an a pnon· 
existence ascribed to them It must be considered obligatory a priori to be not 
to lie, not to beat one's wife, to bring up children and so forth; so we are going to do 
a little work on the subject, which will enable us to show that these values exist all 
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the same, inscribed in an intelligent heaven although, of course, there is no God. In 
other words ... nothing will be changed if God does not exist; we shall discover the 
same norms of honesty, progress and humanity, and we shall have disposed of God 
as an out-of-date hypothesis which will die away quietly of itself. The existentialist, on 
the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disap-
pears with him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no 
longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to 
think it. It is nowhere written that "the good" exists, that one must be honest or must 
not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men.21 
Likewise, the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche confidently proclaimed that the 
"death of God" should have for one of its practical outcomes a Copernican revolution in 
the way we think of ethics. Traditionally exalted moral virtues such as humility, altruism, 
and compassion, now seen as expressions of abject weakness, should be eclipsed with the 
strong virtues of selfishness, ruthlessness, and pride. In Nietzsche's case, then, upholding tra-
ditional morality after the death of God wasn't even a concern; it was his agenda to effect 
his transvaluation of values, according to which good might be called evil, and evil good." 
Irrespective of one's views of Nietzsche and his legacy, his is one more example of 
atheists themselves recognizing the vital link between God and traditionally understood 
moral values, between theism and ethics. The violence potentially done to morality by its 
divorce from God is not a warning issued only by theists. A number of thoughtful 
philosophers, both theists and atheists, have drawn the conclusion that, if God does not 
exist, then morality, understood as something more than convention or conditioning 
alone, lacks a firm foundation or, to use Paul Taylor's word, "grounding." 
W. T. Stace, attributing the emergence of moral relativism to the social, intellectual, and 
psychological conditions of our time, diagnoses the situation as follows: 
We have abandoned, perhaps with good reason, the oracles of the past Every age, of 
course, does this. But in our case it seems that none of us knows any more whither to 
tum. We do not know what to put in the place of that which has gone. What ought 
we, supposedly civilized peoples, to aim at? What are to be our ideals? What is right? 
What is wrong? What is beautiful? What is ugly? No man knows. We drift helplessly 
in this direction and that We know not where we stand nor whither we are going" 
Many atheists and secularists, however, wish to salvage a meaningful morality from the 
unpalatable implications of their worldview, as even Sartre and Nietzsche attempted. 
Philosophers thus attempt to defend and account for the existence of moral facts without 
any appeal to God, thereby also accounting for why we ought to live moral lives and for 
why moral obligations sometimes apply even when they conflict with one's personal wel-
fare. Kurt Baier, for instance, tries this by arguing that morality really is in one's interest 
after all, thereby accounting for why we ought to live morally. Richard Brandt, as well, 
acknowledging that duty sometimes violates personal preferences, first concludes that 
whether such a duty ought to be carried through "may vary from one person to another. 
It depends on what kind of person one is, what one cares about" But he then proceeds 
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to write, "It is, of course, no defense of one's failure to do one's duty, before others or 
society, to say that doing so is not 'reasonable' for one in this sense."" 
George Mavrodes responds to such arguments effectively, in my view. In tenns of 
Brandt's point, he writes 
And this is just to bring the queer element back in. It is to suppose that besides 'the 
kind of person' I am and my particular pattern of' cares' and interests there is some-
thing else, my duty, which may go against these and in any case properly overrides 
them. And one feels that there must be some sense of 'reasonable' in which one 
can ask whether a world in which that is true is a reasonable world, whether such a 
world makes any sense.25 
In response to Brandt's argument that (a) it is in everyone's best interest to act morally and, 
therefore, (b) it is in my best interest to act morally as well, Mavrodes asks whether (a) is 
to be understood collectively or distributively. If the fonner, then (b) doesn't follow from 
it, for it may not be in my best interest for everyone to act morally, even if it is in the best 
interest of the group as a whole, for the interest of the group as a whole may be 
advanced by the sacrificing of my interest. If (a) is understood in the distributive sense, 
Mavrodes notes that another objection arises, namely, that it seems obvious that personal 
self-interest, at least in the short run, will be further advanced in a situation in which 
everyone else acts morally but I act immorally, at least in selected cases, than it will in case 
everyone, including me, acts morally.26 
It is no doubt to each person's benefit that others act morally, and undoubtedly it is to 
each person's benefit that he or she at times act morally. But clearly there are many occa-
sions when acting immorally appears to be in an individual's self-interest (or at least when 
acting morally is not in the agent's best interest). It was for this reason that Rene Descartes 
expressed the view that 
Since in this life there are often more rewards for vices than for virtues, few would 
prefer what is right to what is useful, if they neither feared God nor hoped for an 
after-lifer 
Even Philippa Foot's efforts to argue that morality always gives people some reason to act 
leaves unanswered the question of why people ought to live morally when doing other-
wise would go undetected. Such a failure to account for a reason to be moral in such a 
situation has a significance beyond merely the conclusion that what can be motivated 
are not particular acts so much as a general commitment to rules or a moral disposition. 
Rather, it goes to show that, even if a non-theistic account motivates altruistic behavior, it 
is still deficient to motivate effectively and justify intellectually an altruistic character-a 
further aspect of morality, captured by the virtue tradition in ethics, and related to the 
earlier mention of motives.28 In Gregory Kavka's attempt to construct a reconciliation of 
morality and self-interest, for instance, his project concerns rules of action or ways of life 
rather than motives or reasons for action. 
Even if Kavka's reconciliation project-which makes reference to internal sanctions like 
"••·•'!-< .. ., .• , .... .... ,,, ....... ,;.oul•I•<·--•••• • •·· .... 11' 'I Ml""'" •I••• l .1 l<,·l••I '' , ..... 
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conscience and the satisfactions of morality-succeeds, of course (and I suspect to a large 
degree it does), that provides no good reason to think that morality's binding force resides 
in its prudential advantages-the practical or pragmatic benefits for those performing the 
actions. For such benefits might well be the result of doing what is intrinsically right. Take 
the case of feeding the poor. Kavka rightly shows that potential prudential benefits accrue 
to the action of feeding the poor, such as a stronger economy, less risk of rebellion, and 
greater numbers of competent workers. But clearly the binding prescriptive component of 
morality, Kavka himself would probably agree, is not located in such social advantages of 
feeding the poor. Morality dictates the intrinsically right action to be feeding the poor, 
even if no such social benefits were to result. That they in fact do result does not make 
them the grounding of morality, especially in the mind of one like Kavka, it would seem, 
who retains such a strong set of traditional moral convictions. 
Besides accounts like those to make sense of morality apart from appeals to the divine, 
there is always possible an appeal to brute fact, the theory of metaphysical intuitionism or, 
perhaps, Platonic realism. Perhaps moral facts, including obligations at times to sacrifice 
self-interest, are just emergent facts in this world, synthetic necessary truths knowable a 
priori by a moral intuition, with no explanation possible in terms of naturalistic parts. Here 
the theist is often confronted with a surprisingly formidable opponent. But the theist is not 
obligated to show that a theistic universe is the only possible explanation, but merely the 
best explanation. <To show that it's merely a good and coherent explanation would be an 
accomplishment in many of philosophy's contemporary quarters') And many atheists, 
confronted with the option of this theory of brute facts, on the one hand, and something 
like a naturalist's account of the strength of moral intuitions in terms of either deeply held, 
habitually conditioned social mores or in terms of moral facts somehow supervening on 
natural facts, on the other, have found the latter to be the considerably more rational 
option. Objective naturalism, in other words, seems the considerably more formidable 
challenge to theistic ethics than intuitionism; and a fuller explication of theistic ethics 
would have to confront this challenge more directly. Fruitful lines of inquiry might high-
light such challenges naturalism faces in accounting for a sufficiently meaningful free will 
to undergird morality, how moral prescriptions can be invested with the kind of qualita-
tive force we think they deserve, or how the quest for reproductive advantage can 
explain moral advantage. 
It might be suggested that we ought to believe in moral facts for the same reason we 
ought to believe in brute epistemological facts-such as the propriety of the principle of 
abduction: the principle of inference to the best explanation that is being used in this very 
essay to argue for theistic ethics. Or construe the suggestion like this: the line of argument 
sketched so far might be applied equally well to epistemology as to morality and thereby 
shown unsound. Morality and epistemology do, as a matter of fact, seem to be on a par 
in critical respects; alleged facts in each arena contain both descriptive and prescriptive 
components, for instance. However, obligations and sacrifices of self-interest are not near-
ly as involved in epistemology as in ethics; and violations of epistemological principles, 
even at their most egregious, simply don't begin to raise people's ire to the degree that the 
General's actions do, nor should they. Nor do the most brilliant applications of the princi-
ple of inference to the best explanation inspire people (with the possible exception of a 
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few analytic philosophers) to the degree of seeing a truly selfless act of love or heroism. 
So if we don't view it as odd, morality retains distinctive features which afford it a unique 
capacity to inform our understanding of the world. 
Of course, some see moral facts as just irredeemably odd, and thus are not convinced 
of their reality at all. The very epistemological sort of evidence adduced here in support of 
ontological issues about ethics leads certain anti-realists in ethics to deny that such facts 
exist apart from the seemingly necessary education of human sensibilities. \These philoso-
phers are not to be confused with those ··realists• who would cite only social ontology.) 
However bedrock our moral intuitions may appear, the argument goes, they are not hard-
wired into human nature. What better proof of this is there, a friend writes, than ••the casu-
aL even delighted manner in which small children tear the wings off flies and otherwise tor-
ture insects and torment pets? Children need to learn what cruelty is, and what counts as 
cruelty ... This point is worthy of much attention, but for now just three brief points will be 
made. First, to show that a process of socialization is necessary for healthy moral develop-
ment is not to show it is thereby sufficient to account for moral intuitions and their corre-
sponding contents. Second, Christianity in particular, with its communal theology of the 
human condition and its teachings about original sin, seems uniquely capable of accounting 
for both the necessity of socialization and the cruelty in men (and boys). Third, ifs not pre-
tended here that the admittedly rudimentary comments to follow are enough to persuade 
any committed anti-realist in ethics who would reject even the best explanation of moral 
facts as inadequate to justify belief in moral facts. But then again, philosophical argument 
may sometimes be the least effective means of reaching philosophers. 
A THEISTIC ACCOUNT 
The odd features of alleged moral facts strike many philosophers as strange, leading 
them to doubt their existence, as we have seen. What these philosophers do, in denying 
moral facts, is conform their understanding of the world to their picture of the way the 
world ought to look like. Since they can't make sense of moral facts in a determined 
world with no God, no libertarian freedom, no essential human nature, no room for gen-
uine moral responsibility or retributive justice, it is only intellectually honest that many of 
them deny the existence of moral facts altogether, chalking moral convictions up to 
upbringing and/or society and nothing more. 
What will be done here, though, is different: The seeming existence and apparent 
nature of moral facts will be used to shape our understanding of the world. Why try to 
hammer morality into categories that really presuppose that we already know what the 
world is like, all the while turning a deaf ear to morality0 s instructive nature? Maybe 
morality should instead be allowed to affect our view of the world, changing it to include 
such entities as moral facts and to accord them epistemic value in our effort at under-
standing life and its meaning. 
If a non-theistic universe fails to provide the best account for the existence of moral 
facts, what does? Since morality's existence and prescriptive force seem strong. the best 
explanation of such a state of affairs is, I submit, theism. To put it in Stace's terms, our dis-
missal of the ·oracles of the pas( may have been too hasty. The distinctive features of 
moral facts make them more at home, less odd, in a theistic universe than in an atheistic 
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one, perhaps making God's obituary premature. Morality in its various features-including 
its entailment of genuine obligation, libertarian freedom, retributive justice, and sacrifice of 
self·interest (at least in the short run), with love and relationship as paramount-has for its 
best explanation a creative God who has in some sense inscribed his own loving and rela· 
tional nature into the world, fashioning human beings in his image and according to his 
intentions, and imbuing them with moral intuitions which, if properly socially mediated, 
provide reliable insight into the ethical nature of God, themselves, and the world. 
The details of such a theistic account do not pretend to have been derived through sheer 
rationality here, out of whole cloth, but are admittedly the salient moral attributes of God as 
understood in the great monotheistic traditions, and particularly Christianity. That said, most 
all of what is presented here is also fully consistent with an Anselmian conception of deity as 
the possessor of the maximally compossible conjunction of the various "omni" -qualities. The 
suggestive argument here is that a theistic account of the universe and its creation provides 
the best available explanation of our intuitions of morality as possessing an objective exis· 
tence and binding prescriptive force. Such an argument if made more fully, would obviously 
have to additionally defend theism against pantheism and other religious views that differ 
radically from Christianity. Potential help here might be found in specifically Christian doc· 
trine about a personal and immanent God offering transforming grace to enable us to cross 
the "moral gap," to use john Hare's phrase, and live the kind of life to which he calls us. 
Whether God exists, of course, is no small debate; i(s not a question about whether 
one more thing exists in the inventory of reality. "It is a question about the ultimate con· 
text for everything else," Morris writes. "The theist and the atheist should see everything 
differently."" little wonder that Nielsen's arguments, cited earlier, examined features of 
this world, with the assumption that God doesn't exist, and concluded that morality can 
escape unscathed without him. It is also little wonder that those committed to believing in 
God's existence and who find theistic ethics somehow compelling are often unconvinced 
by such arguments, thinking them hollow and somehow missing the point. Perhaps 
Dostoevsky was right: if God doesn't exist then everything is permitted. But the theist is 
only conjecturing in such a case, for he argues that God does exist as creator of theists and 
atheists alike; and therefore not everything is permitted, negatively, and moral truth pene-
trates the surface of this universe to its core, positively. 
Reconsider moral intuitions in light of this. Morality, as traditionally understood, entails 
not just rights and duties, but also points toward a whole new set of categories that make a 
discussion of rights and duties, at best an emaciated caricature of this new set of realities. 
Philosopher Eleonore Stump writes that as C. S. lewis maintained in 1he Pilgrim's Regress, 
the vision of certain sorts of beauty fills us with an acute if inchoate longing for something-
the source of the beauty perhaps-and a painful sense that we don't possess it aren't part of 
it now.'° Perhaps morality, in certain of its practical exemplifications, is one of those kinds of 
beauty, like in the sacrifice of Christ, and its privation or perversion a form of ugliness, like 
the General's treachery. 
George Mavrodes, perhaps sensing this same longing, writes 
I come more and more to think that morality, while a fact is a twisted and distorted 
fact. Or perhaps better, that it is a barely recognizable version of another fact, a ver· 
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sion adapted to a twisted and distorted world. It is something like, I suppose, the 
way in which the pine that grows at timberline, wind blasted and twisted low 
against the rock, is a version of the tall and symmetrical tree that grows lower on 
the slopes. I think it may be that the related notions of sacrifice and gift represent 
(or come close to representing) the fact, that is, the pattern of life, whose distorted 
version we know here as morality. Imagine a situation, an "economy'' if you will, in 
which no one ever buys or trades for or seizes any good thing. But whatever good 
he enjoys it is either one which he himself has created or else one which he 
received as a free and unconditional gift And as soon as he has tasted it and seen 
that it is good he stands ready to give it away in his tum as soon as the opportunity 
arises. In such a place, if one were to speak either of his rights or his duties, his 
remark might be met with puzzled laughter as his hearers struggled to recall an 
ancient world in which those terms referred to something important. 
We have, of course, even now some occasions that tend in this direction. Within 
some families perhaps, or even in a regiment in desperate battle, people may for a 
time pass largely beyond morality and live lives of gift and sacrifice. On those occa-
sions nothing would be lost if the moral concepts and the moral language were to 
disappear. But it is probably not possible that such situations and occasions should be 
more than rare exceptions in the daily life of the present world. Christianity, howev-
er, which tells us that the present world is "fallen" and hence leads us to expect a dis-
tortion in its important features, also tells us that one day the redemption of the 
world will be complete and that then all things shall be made new." 
Such an account enables an understanding of love in a far less superficial way than any 
account whose ultimate components are matter and energy. Jeny Walls writes 
Our desire for love and our belief in its importance is supported by the doctrine of 
the Trinity, which maintains that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit always existed in a 
relationship of perfect love, even before the world was created. So love and rela-
tionship are not relative newcomers in the history of the world, which emerged 
accidentally from the blind forces of matter. Rather, love and relationship 'go all the 
way down' in the structure of reality.32 
To put the same point negatively, a theistic ethic adds a qualitatively different and 
morally relevant flavor to blameworthy actions, according to which we don't merely 
offend people, but God himself. Now it is even clearer, by the way, why the study of 
ethics eclipses epistemology in terms of insight into the nature of the universe: God is 
rational, but more importantly God is love. It is into this reality that supererogatory 
actions, particularly, provide a window. 
Love, as God's nature and morality's pinnacle, while containing an ineliminable affec-
tive constituent, transcends mere feeling to encompass attitude, action, and character, a 
view actually much closer to Kant's meaning (than Taylor's earlier suggestion) when he 
said that love as a duty can be commanded. In this way, love, understood as a duty, can 
be coherently commanded after all: not as a mere feeling, but as a practical way of life, a 
. ' ' ' 
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tangible means of treating others.'' God, aware of our inconstant emotional dispositions, 
by commanding love for himself and others confers on us the responsibility to exert what 
control we can-over our actions-with the intent being that the appropriate feelings and 
proper motivations-character-will eventually be formed within us. As Pascal realized, 
again in the words of Morris, 
Action creates emotion. How we behave can influence, over the long run and 
sometimes even on the spot, what attitudes and emotions are operative in our lives. 
And these in tum can open our eyes or blind us to aspects of our objective environ-
ment. They can affect deeply our ability to see the world aright." 
Think of husbands who claim to have "fallen out of love" with their wives, and the fact 
that it is often most obvious that they are not justified to forsake the relationship. 
Emotions are notoriously fickle, and can fluctuate too easily with the ups and downs of 
life. An important question for such an individual to ask himself before placing too much 
stock in his emotions is what actions has he performed or failed to perform which have 
contributed to this loss of feeling? Action and inaction create emotions, as well as vice 
versa. That emotions drive actions is well known and not denied here, but that a largely 
symmetric and reciprocal relation holds bet:\.veen actions and emotions is less recognized. 
It should be obvious that none of this is to trivialize feeling, incidentally. /onathan 
Edwards issued a warning against such a mistake, depicting it a wicked act 
to propagate and est.Dlish a persuasion that all affections and sensible emotions of 
the mind, in things of religion, are nothing at all to be regarded, but are rather to be 
avoided and carefully guarded against, as things of a pernicious tendency. This lwilll 
bring all religion to a mere lifeless formality, and effectively shut out the power of 
godliness, and everything which is spiritual and to have all true Christianity turned 
out of doors. 
As there is no true religion where there is nothing else but affection, so there is 
no true religion where there is no religious affection .... If the great things of religion 
are rightly understood, they will affect the heart .... This manner of slighting all reli-
gious affections is the way exceedingly to harden the hearts of men, and to encour-
age them in their stupidity and senselessness, and to keep them in a state of spiritual 
death as long as they live and bring them at last to death etemal.35 
Love as understood as encompassing both feeling and behavior is indeed commanded in 
the New Testament, with the doxastic recognition that the latter can cultivate the former 
and the former can impassion the latter. 
That behavior can affect sentiments and shape character provides a compelling reason 
why, at some stage of moral development. we as human beings are in need of guidelines 
and moral rules to establish parameters within which behavior is allowable. Such a recog-
nition enables a defense against Nowell-Smith's charge that obedience of God's com-
mands is necessarily infantile. Eventually adherence to such guidelines can enable the kind 
of mature moral life envisioned by Nowell-Smith, though with a different understanding 
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of moral freedom. Moral freedom, according to Christian teaching, is not the autonomy 
to make up what is right and what is wrong, but the capacity to choose to do what is good 
over what is evil. The morally and spiritually free, therefore, are not those who exert 
autonomy irrespective of the objective constraints on what is right and wrong, but who 
freely choose to do that which is right and good 
This understanding of freedom is what may provide a way out of the Euthyphro 
Dilemma. Recall that one of the horns of the dilemma, when morality was rooted in God, 
entailed the scary prospect of God issuing an immoral command, thereby making it right." 
At least a partial solution to this problem is to call into question God's ability to sin; if God 
could never issue such a corrunand, the problem never arises. The problem with such a 
solution is that it doesn't seem a logical impossibility to consider God issuing such a com-
mand, despite Aquinas's attempt to portray it as such. Nevertheless theists like Robert 
Adams wish to assert that it remains necessarily the case that God would not, and in some 
sense could not, issue such a command. But how can such a limit be placed on the activities 
of a God who, in the Anselmian sense, is omnipotent, able to do anything logically possible? 
Such contemporary questions presuppose an understanding of freedom as the free-
dom from the constraints of standard rules or the impositions of others, the autonomy to 
do whatever you want. But that construal of freedom is itself rather morally infantile, 
more germane to our contemporary political context than to the moral and spiritual 
realm. A deeper understanding of freedom construes it as the freedom not to actualize 
certain possibilities. Stories abound of people who, in their expressions of personal auton-
omy, become enslaved to their vices. Genuine freedom is not just freedom to, but free-
dom from. God is free not to sin, and therefore free not to issue an immoral command. 
However, if the statement "God is good" is understood as synthetic and substan-
tive, and not merely analytic and a function of language, then its denial can't be self-
contradictory and therefore remains a broadly logical possibility. So how, you might 
ask, can an event (like God issuing an immoral command) which is in some sense a 
possibility nevertheless not be actually possible, and a proposition affirming the occur-
rence of such an event be necessarily false? Because God is the delimiter of possibili-
ties, so that some states of affairs are conceivable, or epistemically possible, but not 
really metaphysically possible. In this connection Morris writes 
For the Anselrnian holds that God exemplifies necessarily the properties of omnipo-
tence, omniscience, and goodness. Because of this, God has the unique ontological 
role of being a delimiter of possibility. To put it simply, some maximal groupings of 
propositions which, if per impossible, God did not exist would constitute possible 
worlds, do not count as genuinely possible worlds due to the constraints placed on 
possibility by the nature of the creator. Certain worlds can be described with full 
consistency in first order logic but are such that, for example, their moral qualities 
preclude their even possibly being actualized or allowed by an Anselmian God. P 
That love and such freedom are the ultimate product of morality thus understood lib-
erates morality from a mere emphasis on rules and regulations. An understanding of 
morality emancipated from slavish dependence on laws and guidelines makes sense of 
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the inevitable grey areas that can invariably be found in dilemma ethics. In the realm of 
rules and duties and such, relativities and exceptions to the rule exist; but that is more tol-
erable in a system ruled not by an impersonal Kantian law to which human beings need 
to be unswervingly committed, but rather a personal God. Not an arbitrary God, exacer-
bating the Euthyphro Dilemma, but one who always acts in love and keeps his promises, 
not out of compulsion, but out of His unchanging nature of love. 
The point, again, is not that God isn't free to do otherwise, but that He's free not to. 
Preoccupation with whether God is free to do what is evil is a function of what we can 
call the Minimalist Strategy: talk of morality just in terms of rules and rights and duties, a 
strategy that is sometimes essential, often important, but never ultimate.38 Morality as con-
strued by theistic ethics points beyond what is penultimate and minimalist to that which 
our acute if inchoate longing apprehends. It points to that place of morality on the other 
side of rights and duties, where there shall be no occasion for any prohibition, envisioned 
by Mavrodes, quoted earlier, where "if one were to speak either of his rights or his duties, 
his remark might be met with puzzled laughter as his hearers struggled to recall an ancient 
world in which those terms referred to something important."39 
Morality is not the deepest thing ... it is provisional and transitory ... due to serve its 
use and then to pass away in favor of something richer and deeper.40 
REWARDS AND PuNISHMENTS 
Such idealizations are well and good, but perhaps recall for us the last challenge to the-
istic ethics that will be briefly treated here: Isn't religious adherence just disguised egoism 
to get into heaven and avoid hell? As Alasdair Macintyre writes, 
If I am liable to be sent to hell for not doing what God commands, I am thereby 
provided with a corrupting, because totally self-interested, motive for pursuing the 
good. When self-interest is made as central as this, other motives are likely to dwin-
dle in importance and a religious morality becomes self-defeating, at least insofar as 
it was originally designed to condemn pure self-interest." 
This type of objection, Jerry Walls notes, has the most force when the sufferings of hell 
are seen more as an externally imposed punishment, bearing no necessary relation to the 
nature of the moral action involved But the objection loses some of its momentum when 
the anguish of hell is seen as a function of a life of evil. IT o some extent, a similar point 
may apply to the joy of heaven being a function of choosing good, though the grace of 
God that enables heaven goes far beyond any merely natural consequences.) This point 
too is vulnerable to a Kantian-styled objection that criticizes moral motivation to avoid evil 
simply to avoid the anguish that is typically a natural consequence of such actions and 
attitudes in a moral world. To the Kantian must be conceded some ground at this point; 
heaven and hell do, at some level, appeal to self-interest." 
But not all self-interest is selfish, and proper self-interest is a legitimate part of genuine 
moral motivation." This is particularly the case when the self-interested motivation takes 
for its normative form the renunciation of self-absorption and -indulgence. Further, an 
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action that is in one's self-interest may have been sufficiently motivated by something 
other than self-interest to qualify as something for which to be praised." And even Kant 
himself insisted that practical rationality demands the postulate of a God who will ensure, 
ultimately, that the virtuous are the happy. Mavrodes writes that "what we have in Kant is 
the recognition that there cannot be, in any 'reasonable' way, a moral demand upon me, 
unless reality itself is committed to morality in some deep way."" Theistic ethics, it has 
been argued, is the best explanation of how reality itself is thus committed, thus providing 
a liberation from a Stoic commitment to morality without the psychologically vital confi-
dence that reality itself is ultimately concerned about the best interests of moral persons. 
Lest this defensive maneuver designed to salvage the connection between God and 
morality against Kant's objection lose sight of an important point, it should be remem-
bered that what the theological stance is being criticized for here is the "vice" of solving a 
heretofore intractable moral dilemma. That dilemma resides in attempting to reconcile 
morality as concurrently requiring sacrifice of self-interest and protection of self-interest. 
What has been presented are some steps in the direction of accounting for a meaningful, 
coherent, and consistent way to retain both of these moral intuitions in synergistic bal-
ance, by distinguishing between short-term and long-term interest and pointing to the 
nature of the ethical acts performed in a moral world. 
Heaven and hell, thus understood within a matrix of orthodox religious beliefs—
according to which salvation is not earned but received through faith in Christ's sacrifice, 
involving both orthodoxy and orthopraxy—can at least potentially offer substantive moti-
vation to live morally, and perhaps even endure sacrifice of personal interest or even per-
secution. Since it is often agreed that the proper contents of ethics, generally speaking, are 
not what is up for grabs so much as any sufficiently motivating factors to do what is right, 
the doctrines of heaven and hell may well provide some hard and needed motivation to 
live the kind of moral life that makes best sense when understood within a larger context 
than this life alone. 
CONCLUSION 
To sum up, then, theistic ethics, following some of the suggestions in this paper, retains 
the potential of being shown to account for moral facts better than secular ethics and to 
provide a strong account of moral motivation. Such an ethic need not, and properly 
understood does not, entail a simplistic correlation between doctrinal belief or religious 
affiliation and moral practice, nor does it of necessity contain elements that are essentially 
infantile. To the contrary, it affirms that all human beings, having been created in God's 
imago dei, are capable of intuitively grasping and rationally understanding the moral order 
which, given its salient features, has for its best explanation a theistic premise, providing 
the best available account of love understood in more than a superficial way. Love thus 
understood as more than mere emotion indeed can be commanded and thereby facilitate 
the process of moral maturity by the reciprocal relationship that obtains between emotion 
and action, according to a notion of freedom which also makes possible God's willful 
inability to issue immoral commands.'" 
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